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Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) have been used as an instrument to revitalize, 
strengthen and recover commercial districts in cities in North America for several decades. In 
May 2015, the Chilean government started a pilot program: Commercial District Enhancement 
Program (Fortalecimiento de Barrios Comerciales, FBC), which aims to implement BIDs in 
several cities. The BID model is based on an increase in property taxes to generate extra 
revenues that are appointed to provide or complement services such as sanitation, security, and 
marketing in a particular district. Based on data collected through interviews and using NYC as a 
point of comparison, this thesis analyzed the approach of the Chilean BID model in order to 
inform key issues, such as the need for strong associations, access to permanent revenues, and 
services provided. Notwithstanding, results show the Chilean pilot program is it currently stands 
to be unsuccessful; the program is not designed to address the long-term goal economically 
sustainable commercial districts.  
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In 1970, the first Business Improvement District was created in Toronto, Canada, was 
focused on streetscapes improvements and special events (Ellen, Schwartz, Voicu, Brooks, & 
Hoyt, 2007). Six years later, in 1976, New York City's first BID was established1, and since then, 
the model has been used to revitalize, strengthen and recover commercial districts in central 
areas. In May 2015, Chile started the implementation of a pilot program called Commercial 
District Enhancement (Fortalecimiento de Barrios Comerciales, FBC), which aims to promote 
associations among business owners to foster economic development in commercial areas and 
which has been outlined with similar goals to those of the BID model. Results of this first 
experience will be reviewed in May 2016 to inform the definitive version of the program. The 
goal of this thesis is to analyze the Chilean pilot program in respect to BIDs formation process, 
association structures and funding to better understand their possible impacts on the program 
success and on the even/uneven distribution of benefits among stakeholders. NYC’s experience 
is used as a benchmark to provide recommendations for the Chilean’s pilot program final 
definition and implementation. 
Since Jane Jacobs (Jacobs, 1992) urban planners have advocated to empower 
communities in the decision-making of process planning, or at least in having instances for their 
voices to be heard by promoting a bottom-up planning approach. Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs) can be understood as an example of the public having more opportunity to 
                                                
1 Fulton Mall in Brooklyn was formed in June 1976 as a Special Assessment District (SAD).(SBS, n.d.) 
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participate in planning processes. According to Morcol and Zimmerman BIDs are "publicly 
sanctioned special districts and the organizations that provide a wide range of services to these 
districts and most commonly rely on self-assessments as a major revenue source"(Morcol et al., 
2008, p. 30). This governmental policy promotes the formation of civil associations to plan and 
work for their own local interests, where the initiative to take action comes from the community 
and takes the form of a nonprofit organization that leads its implementation. The result is the 
creation of a new level of governance where public-private boundaries are blurry, 
representativeness of stakeholders (residents, street vendors, small business owners) is not well 
defined, and a private board usually in conflict with personal interests makes decisions about the 
public realm. At the end, the bottom-up planning approach ends up in the hands of a few.  
When the City of NYC approves a BID, a managing board, also called BID, is created. 
This board is a private (nonprofit) or public governing body, which concentrates the power of 
decision-making, and is in charge of leading the planning and implementation of the 
development strategies for the district. Two of the most controversial issues about BIDs are the 
boards' accountability — held only to those members with a tax burden—; and the stakeholder’s 
representativeness — very often property owners prevailed over business owners and in the 
majority of cases residents are left outside (Morcol et al. 2008). None of these topics has been 
fully studied by the literature, particularly not under New York City’s regulations or in respect to 
BIDs responsibilities to non-member stakeholders. 
For her second period (2014 - 2018) as Chilean President, Michelle Bachelet defined an 
agenda focused on productivity, innovation and growth to be developed by the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Tourism, which had the goal to diversify the country’s economy. 
Among the forty-seven actions proposed, number forty-one directly affects cities at a local level 
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by promising the creation of a program to strengthen commercial districts. According to the 
Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism (2014a), 
Commercial neighborhoods are employment and growth sources for many micro 
and small enterprises. In a country that grows in an inclusive manner, commercial 
development cannot leave behind smaller businesses, which compile a 
fundamental public role in the city and in the community around them, in many 
cases defining its identity. When enterprises that are part of a commercial 
neighborhood are able to coordinate they can solve common problems and finance 
good and services of common interest easily. A policy that facilitates the 
association, coordination and activities of collaborative character financing can 
help to create synergies and shared benefits. 
 
We will create a commercial neighborhood strengthening program. The program 
would be implemented by Sercotec and will finance the execution of associative 
projects, as technical assistance and training, marketing investigation, marketing 
actions, acquisition of physical assets and infrastructure enabling, among others. 
The goal is to create a common strategy for the neighborhood, which differentiate 
it from other competing places and that boost its commercial attributes and 
cultural identity. 
– (Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, 2014a) 
After collaborative work among national, regional and local agencies, experts, technicians, and 
local commercial associations, sixty areas in the country were selected to be part of the pilot 
phase of the FBC program. SERCOTEC, the Technical Cooperation Service (Servicio de 
Cooperación Técnica), in charge of the program’s design and implementation, organized it in 
three phases: pre-investment, investment, and consolidation2. Pre-investment considers funds to 
create a commercial and urban development plan for the district that defines strategies, projects 
and programs for short, medium and long-term. In the second stage, Investment, districts will 
apply for government grants to access public funds to finance the implementation of the plan 
defined in the first phase. Finally, the Consolidation phase refers to the moment when districts 
are capable of permanently finance activities and services needed to sustain the economic 
                                                
2 See appendix for the complete list of districts selected. 
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benefits and social capital improvements obtained during the program’s implementation. Most of 
the designated districts are currently working on the first stage with a main focus in creating 
social capital and strengthening associations; they should be ready to pass to the investment 
phase in May 2016. At this same time, SERCOTEC has planned to make changes to the program 



















Figure 1 - Location of the 60 districts selected for the pilot phase of the FBC 
program in Chile 
 8 
 
In New York City (NYC), the policy to renew commercial areas works in a different way 
than the one proposed in Chile. For starters, in the first, the policy has been defined as self-help 
through self-taxation, where the BID provides extra services in public spaces maintenance, street 
cleaning and security in exchange for higher property taxes. Another important difference is that 
in NYC property owners apply to this benefit, while in Chile districts are proposed and 
designated by local and national authorities. Lastly, Chilean regulations do not allow taxes to be 
assigned a priori to a particular purpose, meaning funds come from different sources when 
comparing to NYC BIDs, but they would still act over public space, impacting the community 
beyond the BID area. While both programs are constrained by different regulations and financial 
models, both base the success of the program on promoting private associations to get access to 
private and public resources in order to boost and strengthen their commercial activity.  
Two research questions guide this study: (1) How to create a BID in Chile? (2) How does 
the Chilean program and context fits into the NYC BID model? First, this paper will present a 
literature review to frame and explain the mayor issues BID need to address based on the impacts 
they create on cities and communities. Then, it will examine BIDs in NYC to provide a 
background to understand the BID model. Subsequently, this paper will explain the methods of 
data collection and analysis utilized, which were based mainly on personal interviews. Following 
this, findings on the Chilean program will be discussed and compared to the NYC BID model. 
Finally, this paper will provide recommendations for both SERCOTEC and business owners. 
Final results of this study show that in order for the Chilean program to succeed as a BID 
model it needs to be fully defined, have better planning for long-term goals, improve 
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communication, focus the resources in a few districts to define the pilot program from start to 
end, and incorporate local governments.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The creation of Business Improvement Districts has been studied from very different 
perspectives. This means BIDs have been defined based on the implications they have had as 
government instruments in governance, local economy, urban revitalization, and democracy. 
However, the participatory process and requirements for BID formation, the implications of the 
administrative structure of the organization and the role of the government –all factors related to 
the even or uneven distribution of benefits– have not been studied in depth. 
First of all, it is important to mention that authors use the term Business Improvement 
District (BID) for both the geographic area and the institution responsible for its administration. 
This distinction is important when defining BIDs (Morcol et al., 2008). Second, it is important to 
know the BID categorization proposed by Gross (2005). She defines three types of BIDs based 
on their revenue, which determines the type of services they provide. Small BIDs are focused 
mainly on physical maintenance, midsized ones add marketing and promotional activities and 
large BIDs also work on capital improvements. 
As mentioned above, different authors have proposed different definitions for BIDS. 
They are revitalization tools for commercial areas, examples of privatization of public services, 
self-governance by communities of business owners, private-public partnership, and self-help 
private governments. In an attempt to convey all definitions into one, Morcol defines BIDs as 
"self-assessment districts that are initiated and governed by property or business owners and 
authorized by state or local governments to operate in designated urban and suburban geographic 
areas". (Morcol et al., 2008, p. XV) 
In relation to those definitions, authors have studied the impacts of the BID model by 
using different indicators to measure it success. Sutton (2014) focuses on the economic impact 
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taking sales and employment increase as factors to compare the performance of different scales 
of BIDs with areas in the city without that condition. She concludes that small BIDs are least 
likely to succeed. Hoyt (2005) found that crime rates in BID areas in Philadelphia are lower than 
in the rest of the city. The last of the three impacts studied is property value, in this case Ellen 
(Ellen et al., 2007) argues that BIDs have positive impacts on commercial property values, but 
this variation is not consistent in all types of BID. Both Sutton (2014) and Ellen (Ellen et al., 
2007) bring the idea that BIDs success is related to their size, stating that the model is not 
necessarily a good policy for areas with small businesses. From their results and conclusions it is 
clear that scale should be considered when studying BIDs, particularly small BIDs because their 
results differ considerably from the rest. However, in the process of fully understanding BID 
success the impact on the community should also be addressed.  
Morcol and Zimmerman (Morcol et al., 2008) present the issue of the power of decision-
making given to owners of large properties by the weighted vote3 . They state that taking this 
vote system away would be contradicting the idea of having larger stakeholders making the 
bigger investments, as well as leading and promoting BID formation. Anchor businesses are 
interested in investing more capital than the rest only if they have control over decision-making. 
In the same line, Sutton (2014) argues that in order for BIDs to be successful and sustainable 
they need to have a mix of business types; both anchors and small companies. Both sources 
acknowledge the existence of a conflict in BID formation, particularly in the uneven relationship 
created between capital contributions and the power conferred to each stakeholder based on 
property assets.  
                                                
3 In order for a BID to be approved they need the support of the 51% of business property owners, but the 
votes are weighted by the property assessment, meaning larger properties votes have more value. 
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In respect to accountability, Hochleutner (2003) is the only author that studies this issue 
as a main impact and not as a secondary effect. He analyzes BIDs from a legal perspective 
arguing that BID boards ought to be monetary accountable only to business owners or business 
property owners that are being taxed. Furthermore, Hochleutner argues that BIDs are politically 
accountable to the extended community for two reasons: first, there is a local elected official at 
the BID board; and second the local government is in charge of BID oversight after they have 
been approved. Morcol discusses this explanation stating that taxpayers and local governments 
have little control over BID actions; a situation that can easily lead to a "private agenda" 
financed with "public funds"(Morcol et al., 2008, p. 11). The argument is that representatives of 
already existing Business Organizations are the same ones leading BIDs boards. According to 
Morcol and Zimmermann (Morcol et al., 2008) this can be understood as BIDs being just a legal 
shell to have access to more resources for already organized business associations with similar 
interests which would pursued the same goals as before the BID formation, although now with 
an incremented capital. The result is a tax burden for all business related properties where those 
owners that are not part of these associations are charged with an extra tax fee without having a 
say in the way their money is being invested. Then, there is a risk of uneven distribution of 
benefits among property owners. However, the argument presented does not address how BIDs 
can impact residents. Even if residents do not get a considerable tax burden, BIDs should be also 
accountable to them. After all, most of the services they provide happen on public space, thus 
affecting residents' public space enjoyment. BIDs community involvement strategies could 
account for this, but there is a lack of studies evaluating BIDs performance in respect to the 
participatory process itself and how the BID boards’ structure and modus operandi is prevented 
from impacting that process. 
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One last point to address about BIDs literature is a gap in exploring the role nonprofit 
organizations play in this new type of governance; a self-governing one that is not completely 
public neither private. Ferris (1998) uses different theories to explain the role of these 
organizations based on the concept of collective choices: public goods, trust goods, and club 
goods. The last one suits the BID model: "individuals (or organizations) will band together to 
ensure that the goods would be provided under conditions that they control, including being able 
to exclude individuals from participating and benefiting" (Ferris, 1998, p.142). The role 
nonprofit organizations have in governance is not well defined, and, unlike Philadelphia, where 
boards can be governmental institutions or nonprofits, in NYC they can only be nonprofits. This 
same condition would likely apply in Chile. Thus, the role BIDs have as institutions and how the 
government regulates it is a key aspect to understand the level of democracy in the 
implementation of this policy, particularly in relation to representativeness and participation.  
The literature review shows BIDs as a new model of governance with blurred limits 
between public and private interests and rights. Authors have shown the distribution of benefits 
is not necessarily even, and that BIDs are not accountable for the whole community even if they 
are using public resources and infrastructure. A big part of the researchers referred to BID 
formation and board composition as a probable cause for these uneven results, but they do not 
explore its impacts in depth. There is a need to complement the literature by studying BIDs 
beyond the economic success and neighborhood change. As already showed by Meltzer (2010) 
and Morcol (Morcol et al., 2008) with their literature analysis there is still much to be studied. 
One gap that can be identified is in the impact of the BID formation process, with regards to the 
approval process and board structure, as a key aspect of the distribution of benefits and 
accountability beyond property owners.  
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BACKGROUND: NEW YORK CITY 
In 1970, the first Business Improvement District was created in Toronto, Canada; it was 
focused on streetscapes improvements and special events (Ellen, Schwartz, Voicu, Brooks, & 
Hoyt, 2007). Six years later, in 1976, New York City's first BID was established4; since then, the 
model has been used to revitalize, strengthen and recover commercial districts in central areas. 
Today the city has more than seventy BIDs and the number continues to grow5. The diverse size 
and types of BIDs, with more than forty years of history, make the city a rich case to use as 
comparison point for evaluating the Chilean pilot program. 








                                                
4 Fulton Mall in Brooklyn was formed in June 1976 as a Special Assessment District (SAD).(SBS, n.d.) 
5 According to SBS (Small Business Services) official website, there are 72 BIDs approved. While other districts are 
either in the process of expanding or formation. As an example, 82nd Street BID is trying to expand its area to more 







































































































































































































































































More than fifty percent of BIDs in NYC were formed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a 
response to a time of disinvestment in the inner areas when sanitation and security were the main 
concerns for business owners. Today, the goal of creating a BID has changed. Their major role is 
to provide marketing and commercial promotion to increase sales, although culture of collective 
action remains (personal interview, March 18, 2016). Property and business owners keep on 
forming associations to strengthen the commerce in their areas by taking advantage of the BID 
policy. As an example, the number one reason for Atlantic Avenue to exist is to bring costumers 
to the district, then the greater effort is put into marketing: shopping guides, banners on poles, 
social media and public relations. According to BID staff interviewed, the success of these 
associations into becoming a BID depends on three factors: a common goal, permanent revenues 
and trust, which are linked to the requirements and structure defined by the city for BID approval 
and operation (personal interviews, March 15 and 18, 2016). 
Common Goal 
It sounds obvious, but it is crucial for BID success to have a common goal. Services must 
respond to agreed community needs and requirements. The approval of a BID is linked to a 
contract with the city based on the District Plan, which defines the services to be provided by the 
BID and allows the city to collect extra taxes to finance them.  According to the Business 
Improvement Districts Trends Report 2014, BIDs spend most of their budget in services, such as 
sanitation, public safety, marketing, and other programs that include social services, business 
development, and miscellaneous programs (NYC Small Business Services, 2014).  
Services provided by NYC BIDs are of two types. First, there are permanent services that 
correspond to all of those are required by law because they are listed in the contract with SBS. 
For example, Myrtle Avenue is obliged to give sanitation, district marketing and holiday lights. 
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Second, BIDs provide complementary services financed by resources collected in addition to 
those coming from tax assessment. This BID works also in attracting businesses to fill up vacant 
spaces, and in retaining existing businesses to maintain those services residents need (basic 
neighborhood stores as drycleaners or gyms). The effort is focused into easing their burden of 
operation by connecting them with city services and providing guidance on lease negotiation. 
Myrtle Avenue also offers grants for storefront improvement, and it is partnered with a law firm 
that uses pro-bono hours to assist merchants with common legal issues. 
The city does not provide enough services for maintaining street trash cans empty in 
commercial areas with a high concentration of daily population. Thus, the sanitation service 
consists in collecting the litter on the street and putting it on bags that the municipality truck 
picks up from the corner next to the trash cans. In this way, the BID can maintain the streets 
clean and create a more attractive environment for consumers. Even if this is one of the services 
tied to the contract with SBS, and most likely the only one that all BIDs share, results of the 
interviews are consistent in saying that their major role is related to marketing. As seen in Table 
1, in average 24% of BID budgets goes to sanitation, 17% to public safety and 13% to marketing, 
while the remaining resources are spent in capital improvements, streetscape, holiday lighting 
and other programs and administration costs.  However the budget distribution varies between 
different sizes of BIDs, for example Myrtle Avenue uses a third of their budget from tax 
assessment funds to cover sanitation expenses, and BIDs in the lower quintile do not have budget 
for capital improvements. Atlantic Avenue services, for example, are limited to streetscapes 
improvements, sanitation service, marketing, and general administration.  
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Table 1 - BID dollar expenditure 2014 (NYC Small Business Services, 2014) 
Category Amount % 
Sanitation $28,812,322 24% 
Public Safety $20,564,763 17% 
Other Programs* $16,765,643 14% 
Marketing $15,225,885 13% 
Capital Improvements $  7,996,326 6% 
Streetscape $  7,037,811 6% 
Holiday Lighting $  1,467,373 1% 
Salaries & Payroll $12,160,746 10% 
Other G&A** $  8,001,898 7% 
Outside Contractors $  2,210,662 2% 
 
*Other program expenses include social services, business development, and miscellaneous programs 
**Other G&A includes rent, office supplies, insurance, and miscellaneous expenses 
 
Among the services provided by BIDs, security and sanitation generate the highest 
controversies. Critics argue that they correspond to public goods that should be provided by the 
city and should not be left to the economic capacity of neighborhoods because it creates 
inequality (Adler, 2000). BID supporters understand these services as complementary to the ones 
provided by the city. They are added benefits and depend on the service the city provides now. 
In addition to the services previously described, both Myrtle and Village Alliance are 
facing now the process of creating a new one: public space management, which is particularly 
the administration, programing and maintenance of plazas. In 2007, Myrtle Avenue was accepted 
as part of the Department of Transportation (DOT) plaza pilot program, an initiative where the 
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city builds new plazas in publicly owned land to be maintained by community organizations in 
the form of a private-public partnership contract. The BID is advocating for this plaza in order to 
draw more people to the area. As the managing entity, it has to keep it clean, repair furniture, and 
do the landscape, but at the same time it has the benefit of being in charge of programing the 
space. In order to be able to fulfill this new service the assessment was raised from USD 425,000 
in 2015 to USD 500,000 in 2016.  
Astor Place, the Village Alliance new project, is a public plaza where the BID would act 
as DOT partner in managing the space. The idea behind this model is to find the proper schedule 
and frequency for activities to happen in the public space without negatively affecting the 
neighbors. According to a BID staff, "the city, through the street activity permits office, allows 
for everything that comes out of the door and the community does not like the results, it is too 
noise, too commercial or it is just not appropriate" (personal interview, March 18, 2016). 
After the agreement permission is granted, they would have to follow a plan defined by 
the BID based on the existent agreement with SBS and any new one with DOT. Managing the 
public space and its programing is becoming a key aspect of BIDs. It allows them to control the 
use of public space to revitalize commercial activity in the district and attract more people to the 
area, hoping to increase business sales. As a BID staff states, "it is important that the design is 
pretty, but we want to set the flavor, the tone of what is happening there" (personal interview, 
March 18, 2016). 
Revenues 
Most BIDs complement their resources with fundraising and grants. However, it is 
necessary to have a permanent source of revenues to ensure the economic sustainability of the 
district. New York State (NYS) regulations allow the city to collect extra taxes from properties 
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inside BIDs boundaries and to transfer them to each BID for the implementation of the District 
Plan. The total amount of tax assessments to be distributed among property owners corresponds 
to the budget approved by the contract with the city. Commercial properties are charged with 
extra taxes depending on the assessment formula defined for each BID, while residential ones are 
charged with a nominal fee of USD 1. 6 In 2014, NYC BIDs collected almost USD 100 millions 
from property tax, about 76% of their total budget. They complemented those funds by 
fundraising (9%), other sources different from grants (7%), and in some cases with plaza 
revenues that sums up to 5% (NYC Small Business Services, 2014).  
 
Table 2 - BID dollar sources 2014 (NYC Small Business Services, 2014) 
Category Amount % 
Assessment $96,639,767 76% 
Fundraising* $11,688,905 9% 
Other Revenues** $  9,476,959 7% 
Plaza Revenues $  6,268,274 5% 
Grants $  1,327,135 1% 
Banners $  1,264,896 1% 
In-Kind $     717,278 1% 
 
*Fundraising includes revenues raised from events, campaigns or similar programs 
**Other Revenues includes special contracts, program service revenue, and other miscellaneous revenue. 
                                                
6 Not-for profit organizations can choose if they want to contribute or not, in the case of Village Alliance they are 
suggested to contribute with fifty percent of what they are supposed to pay based on the property characteristics; 
non-profit contribution is particularly important in this BID because an important portion of properties is owned by 
NYU. (Personal interview, March 18, 2016)  
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According to NYC regulations there are three factors that can be used when defining the 
assessment formula: frontage of a build to the street, square footage and assessment value. BIDs 
use available city information to define the best combination of these indicators. Atlantic Avenue 
based its assessment only in property street frontage. Its Executive Director explains that this 
was the only indicator people forming the BID trusted. The other two were not considered a 
reflection of the services businesses would receive, particularly when the main one is sanitation.  
Arguments against the other indicators were that due to assessment values depending also on the 
current conditions of the property, basically on how well maintained it is, and because all the 
properties in the district have a frontage, then the square footage was not necessary. In the 
meantime, both Myrtle Avenue and Village Alliance calculate the assessment based on a 
combination of storefront and property assessed value. In the case of the latest, the proportion is 
fifty percent for each indicator, meaning that if a property does not have access to the street, it 
only pays what corresponds to its assessed value.  
Both, assessment formula and budget can be modified if needed. Myrtle Avenue 
increased its annual budget in 2015 in order to include more services that needed permanent 
revenues. This required the support from property owners and it was possible because new 
construction in the area with commercial use increased the number of properties taxed. Then, 
even if the total BID assessment went up, what each people paid ended up being less than the 
previous year because the total tax burden is now shared with new properties that used to be 
vacant lots and did not contribute as commercial property.  
Trust 
As non-for profit associations providing services and managing private funds over public 
space, BIDs need the support not only of commercial property owners that are the ones allowed 
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to vote for the BID approval, but also from the rest of the community. They need to be 
accountable, transparent and reliable. For this purpose, they have a defined voting system, a set 
of BID board requirements, and are overseen by the local government. 
i. Voting System 
In order to be approved, BIDs need more than fifty percent of supporting votes from 
commercial property owners exclusively, which are weighted based on each property assessment 
value. If a BID area comprises large property owners, a small group of them can get together to 
reach the required votes without having to involve the rest of the property owners. However, if a 
BID is composed by several small and medium enterprises and a high number of property 
owners it is essential to have the support and commitment of a majority of property owners. In 
most of the cases, it is beneficial to have an already existing active merchant association that 
includes property owners and where natural leaders are already involved. They can advocate for 
the BID formation and develop the trust among their neighbors to get the approval. According to 
a BID staff member: "have leaders with strong relations with others to sell the idea to the 
property owners not involved.... If you do not have that it is a non-starter" (personal interview, 
March 15, 2016). 
ii. BIDs Board Structure 
The BID board structure is given by the NYC regulations. They have four classes of 
voting members and one of non-voting. The first category includes: property owners, which have 
to sum up at least 51%, four representatives of elected officials –Mayor, Comptroller, Borough 
President, and a member of the City Council–, one resident, and commercial tenants that are 
always a minority because they fill up remaining posts. Non-voting members correspond to other 
elected officials as representatives of the State Senators and Community Board members.  
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Elections for BID representatives are made in a yearly base, and people are allowed to 
vote only for their own representative, meaning, merchants vote for merchants, property owners 
for property owners and residents for residents. This system of election allows for rotation. 
However, in the three NYC cases BID representatives have been in the board for long periods, 
and most of them have even been involved from the starting process of BID formation itself. 
Then, Morcol and Zimmerman argument that BID boards are formed by the same people that 
was part of the association pushing for the BID approval (Morcol et al., 2008) holds true for all 
NYC cases studied. 7 
iii. Community and Stakeholders Involvement 
Despite city regulations on BIDs advocacy for property owners’ rights, two of the three 
NYC BIDs make a great effort into giving more representation and work with the community 
and beyond them. Atlantic Avenue BID is continuously looking to incorporate in its board 
property owners that also run businesses in the area in order to increase merchant’s 
representation. However, the number of them has decreased because they have retired, stopped 
running their businesses, or leased out their properties. On the other hand, Myrtle Avenue BID, 
aware that the district has a residential-centered character, has closely worked with MARP, the 
partner association, to provide services for residents, in particular for senior citizens.  
But, even before the BID board itself, it is important to identify who are the people 
invited to participate in the definition and approval of a vision for the district plan, the only 
                                                
7 Myrtle Avenue Revitalization Partnership (MARP) a Local Development Corporation (LDC) created in the 1990s 
and formed in its majority by property owners, was the association leading Myrtle Avenue BID formation and today 
both organizations share the same chair that has not changed since the BID was created in 2004. In the case of 
Atlantic Avenue the Steering Committee formed to lead the BID formation process was set with the same NYC 
requirements for a BID board, with the BID approval it was transitioned into its board. Finally, the case of Village 
Alliance is similar to Atlantic Avenue with the difference that the association leading the process was formed by a 
few large property owners, including New York University (NYU), which owned most of the lots in the area, which 
gave them the 51% needed to approve the BID, and with this the power to decide everything about the BID without 
the support of the community. 
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document the City can use to make BIDs accountable. According to the staff member at Myrtle 
Avenue: 
It is really important, I think, as a BID to continue that, continue that thought in 
your work, everything you do needs to be supported by residents, and I mean 
residents like not just property owners and business owners, but like you need to 
make sure you are engaging property owners and the residents in the 
neighborhood through out your work, can you still doing that? And just making 
sure the work that you are doing it is actually being asked for and called for 
otherwise it may give the impression of lack of transparency, particularly when 
fear of gentrification is one of the community pushback arguments, and make sure 
you reach out residents and go for the right leaders, if you reach out the wrong 
people it can be disastrous. 
– Personal interview, March 15, 2016 
Regardless of the importance a district can have when helping in the involvement of the 
rest of the community, the truth is a BID is going to be approved by the votes of property 
owners. As a result, properties with people that do not want to participate are usually left outside 
the BID limit when possible. In Myrtle Avenue half a mile of the original proposal was left out 
because of a strong push back from merchants. The argument suspected by the BID staff was 
that there was a higher number of merchants that were not property owners in that area. 
Although usually BIDs serve only the business properties located within its boundaries, Myrtle 
Avenue presents a particular approach to the problem of commercial properties left outside 
which are interested in services, particularly to those members of MARP. Having this in mind, 
they implemented a membership-based program, for businesses that are not in the BID, but want 
to be part of some of the services. While they cannot access services like sanitation because they 
are financed by the assessment revenues, they are included in promotional and support activities 
like the annual shopping guide. 
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iv. Local Government Role 
In the case of NYC BIDs, the law is defined at a State level, but the implementation, 
approval and overseen is in charge of the New York City government, which is a similar level to 
the Municipalities in Chile. Small Business Services Department (SBS) is the agency in charge 
of dealing with BIDs approval and overseen, and are public officials at SBS the ones seated at 
BIDs meetings in representation of the Mayor. The agency oversees the contract between BIDs 
and the City. This document is the District Plan that explains all the services each BID is 
required to provide by contract, its area, how is the board made up, and the assessment formula. 
Ultimately, it is the document that enables the legislation that allows the City to collect the taxes 
on their behalf.  
During the year, SBS officials attend board meetings, finance committees, and the annual 
audit meeting. In addition, BIDs submit their audits to SBS once a year and the agency is 
responsible for initiating investigations in case corruption is suspected. The continuous 
interaction between BID boards and SBS representatives allows the city agency to be up to date 
on what the different BIDs in the city are working on or dealing with, and to transfer that 
knowledge between districts in short time. In addition, and particularly important for smaller 
BIDs, SBS provides support with legal issues, collects the BID assessment, and mediates 
between the City Department of Finance and BIDs to annually update the database to define 
commercial properties assessment. SBS also provides extra funding to small BIDs through the 
Avenue NYC grant program. Myrtle Avenue BID, for example, has got this type of funding for 
the last six or seven years.  
In respect to decision-making related to BID management of public spaces, the role of the 
local government has not been defined. If projects are financed by the city then resident’s 
approval is required, but if funding is coming from the BID, then the approval of residents 
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depends on the interest of BID to deal with them. According to the Village Alliance executive 
director, it works under an "it is better ask forgiveness than permission" mode; for some projects 
it is easier and cheaper to take it away or change it after citizens complain than get a previous 
approval. For example, the city gives approval without any process of participation to locate bike 





The purpose of this thesis is to study the implementation of Business Improvement 
Districts through one case (New York City) to later identify lessons to provide recommendations 
based on a second case study (Chile). Therefore, the main data used for analysis is qualitative 
data collected by the author. Data for this study comes from semi-structured interviews; analysis 
of official governmental documents, official press releases and news, as well as observation of 
community meetings. Interviews, which are the main source of information, were targeted to 
business owners and governmental officials involved in the process of formation in Chile, and 
they were complemented with interviews to NYC BID staff and informal conversations with 
academics and experts both in Chile and NYC. Columbia Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approved the interview processes utilized to collect information. 
For the Chilean case, the access to participants and official and working documents (not 
available online) was made through one of SERCOTEC's Program Management Office members 
working on the FBC program definition. With a basic knowledge on the size, area, number of 
businesses and associations, and districts location, four of the sixty districts were selected for 
data collection. The goal was to have a first and general impression on what business owners are 
expecting, what interests they have, how the program is approaching them and the state of art of 
the program when neighborhoods conditions differ. In order to facilitate on-site data collection 
and due to time and budget restrains, the criteria used for the selection was: location in the 
metropolitan region, preferably in the city of Santiago, number of businesses, business/industry 
mix, level of association, strong identity, and being part of different municipalities. From the 
four districts selected, Barrio Victoria, Patronato, San Diego, and Barrio de las Telas, it was 
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possible only to collect information from the first two; information from other districts in the 
program was obtained through interviews with the SERCOTEC team and on-site managers.  
The methodology to contact participants and access to information suits the snowball 
approach to sample selection. Through the SERCOTEC public official mentioned above, it was 
possible to access general documentation of the program and the first interview with on-site 
managers. From there, they provided access to community meetings where business owners were 
reached out to for personal interviews.  
Five on-site interviews were conducted with a total of eight participants between January 
5th and 18th, 2016. First, a collective interview was performed with the SERCOTEC 
Development Officer, and three on-site managers, one of them working with Barrio Victoria and 
San Diego, and the other two with Patronato and La Chimba districts. Information from this 
eighty-minute interview helped to understand how the first stage of the program is being 
implemented, how the community has reacted to it, what are the main obstacles on-site managers 
have encountered so far and first conclusions and comments to the program. 
After making the contact with on-site managers in the first interview, it was possible, 
through them, to get access to two community meetings for observation. The first one in January 
7th at Patronato, that was part of a process of one of the district trust projects, a commercial 
strategy for the area, while the second meeting attended was on January 13th at Barrio Victoria. 
This time merchants were gathered for one of the weekly meetings of the Local Associative 
Group (Grupo Asociativo Local, GAL). These meetings helped to inform about the participatory 
dynamics of the district, collect diverse opinions on different issues related to the implementation 
of the FBC program, understand the Municipality roles, and finally made contact with business 
owners for follow up interviews.  
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From the first of the meetings, two of the three attendees agreed to participate for this 
study: a business, property owner and chamber of commerce member, and one member and 
representative of the street vendor association. From the second district, only one of the three 
business owners present at the meeting was able to collaborate. Open-ended interviews with the 
three business owners were conducted in their respective places of work and took in average 
thirty minutes each. They were asked about their motivation to participate and understanding of 
the program, about their reasons to participate, and finally what did they expect from the 
program.  
The last interview made in Chile was a two and half hours open-ended session with the 
Strategic Programs Coordinator, from the Program Management Office at SERCOTEC, who has 
been involved in designing the FBC program since the beginning. This conversation provided 
valuable information on the origins and scopes of the program, arguments for decisions made so 
far, current and future challenges the program faces in regards to funding and implementation 
(See Appendix for full questionnaires). 
After analyzing the data collected and outlying the first findings on the Chilean case, an 
interview was made via Skype with a SERCOTEC consultant. She was invited to Chile in 2015 
by SERCOTEC to share her experience and provide feedback on the Chilean program. This 
sixty-minute interview helped to confirm the findings on the FBC program and discuss general 
alternatives to overcome the challenges identified based on her more than thirty years of 
experience working with commercial districts. 
Finally, three interviews were conducted with staff members of three NYC BIDs: 
Atlantic Avenue BID, Myrtle Avenue Brooklyn Partnership, and Village Alliance. Due to time 
constrains, the selection of participants was based on access to a referral from a shared contact 
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person. These conversations with open-ended questions provided information on the logic of 
BID operation in NYC, its priorities in terms of services, process of approval and updates, 
community representation, regulations and role of the local government. 
Atlantic Avenue BID, Myrtle Avenue Brooklyn Partnership and Village Alliance are the 
three BIDs used as a point of analysis. Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn was formed in 2011, and it 
has three hundred commercial properties covering fifty-five block faces. It is formed mostly by 
small and medium enterprises, and there is no presence of predominant property owners. Myrtle 
Avenue, Brooklyn, was approved in 2005, and has a hundred and fifty properties on forty block 
faces. Similar to Atlantic Avenue it has a mix of small property and businesses. In addition, there 
are no large property owners that can control the decision-making. Lastly, Village Alliance in 
Manhattan was formed in 1993 with one hundred twenty-nine commercial properties and 
expanded in 2006. Today, it covers sixty-three block faces, providing services for almost four 
hundred businesses. 
Figure 4 - Location of the districts selected for the pilot phase of the FBC program in Santiago Chile 










Santiago New York 
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Data evaluation was based on the interviews’ results that were later cross-referenced with 
observations and official reports. On-site data collected through notes and audio recording in 
Chile was manually processed and analyzed. The analysis focused on two different goals. First, 
to explain how the program was defined and implemented and, second, to identify common 
topics among the different types of stakeholders. After these first results, the questions for 
experts and NYC BID representatives or staff were re-designed to be able to explore in depth the 
issues identified in the Chilean case. In addition, searching for targeted comments to the FBC 
program, a brief description of the preliminary findings was presented to the interviewees. 
Results from these interviews were also manually processed and analyzed. The objective here 
was to look for similarities and differences in context and challenges with the Chilean case.  
Limitations of the data in this study are related to sample size, limited access to districts 
in Chile, and diversity of stakeholders. In order to get a better understanding of how the Chilean 
program has been received by business owners a larger district sample size would have helped. 
Although the outcome would have probably stayed the same, after analyzing the results it was 
evident that more information on districts with less access to municipality resources or with 
lower income was missing to fully understand the implications of a national program in the 
different action contexts. Another important limitation is that information on the support and 
overseen role of the Small Business Services (SBS) office, is only based on BID staff responses 
and documents available in the agency website. A particular effort was put into getting an 
interview with an SBS team member in charge of the relation with BIDs, but it was not possible 
to identify who should be contacted. Access to this information could change some of the 
recommendations and comparisons based on NYC, particularly in respect to the role and 
challenges of the local government.  
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For the data collection, interviews were the main data source, which helped to collect 
recent information, impressions of different stakeholders as a first contact, lessons learned in the 
process, and also get particular examples to help explain similarities and differences between 
both BID models. Because most of the literature review and reports available focus on the results 
and impacts of BIDs and not in its process of formation, interviews were key to understand this 
dynamic both in Chile and New York, although it was particularly important in the Chilean case 
due to its early stage of implementation.  
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: CHILE FBC 
The Commercial District Enhancement Program (Fortalecimeto de Barrios Comerciales, 
FBC) was proposed by SERCOTEC as a response to the 2014 National Economic Productivity 
Agenda. The major goal is to support, promote and coordinate the management of commercial, 
productive and urban development issues of the commercial districts, through funding 
associative projects that generate long-term social capital among merchant’s communities. In 
particular, the program aims to "generate a common strategy to base the commercial 
development of the neighborhood, generation of associations for the project sustainability, to 
increases sales and increase and maintain the number of jobs related to the district commercial 
activity; and finally to the revitalization of the public space where the district is 
located."(SERCOTEC, 2014c, p. 3) 
The strategy is to "enhance the commercial base from the social capital" to reach a self-
management condition and get more access to financing sources. Then, the chosen way to go 
about this program in the first stage was to foster and support associations, being the immediate 
goal that business owners should form a legal association and the long-term one that this 
association get resources for the district (personal interview, January 18, 2016). 
Creating a BID in Chile 
v. Process of BID Creation  
There are at least three possible reasons that can justify why the process to create a 
Business Improvement District has not been defined: it is in its pilot phase; it does not have a 
referent that shares the same legal context in regard to association culture and mechanisms for 
revenue collection; it is the first time that a program like this is being implemented in the 
country. The important point remains the same. The process of BID creation in Chile is not 
 33 
defined and the lack of clarity about its implementation after the first stage is leading to 
confusion that can seriously damage the success of the program. Furthermore, with the current 
state of art and under the umbrella of NYC BID experience, it is unlikely for the program to 
succeed as an economically sustainable BID model. 
According to official governmental documents (SERCOTEC, 2014a) (SERCOTEC, 
2015) and the interview with a public official (personal interview, January 18, 2016) the FBC 
program defines three phases for the pilot program: pre-investment, focused on associations; 
investment, designing and implementation of a short-term plan and strategy definition; and 
consolidation, implementation of the BID model itself in order to reach economic sustainability. 
Only the first one has been described in depth. In addition to this, in one of the interviews a 
public official in charge of designing the program mentioned all three stages and commented that 
the team is still working on the definition of the second phase, where the Ministry of Housing 
and Urbanism, MINVU, becomes an important actor because it is the institution that should 
provide funds to finance urban interventions. Furthermore, when on-site-managers and business 
owners were asked to describe the program, they only identified two phases, the first one based 
on association with a budget of USD 86,000 (CLP 60 millions) and with a district plan that 
would be implemented in the second phase where each district would have access to USD 1,1 
millions (CLP750 millions) from MINVU.  
By January 2015, when interviews where conducted, most of the districts were still in the 
first phase so the discussion would be based on findings related to how the first phase has been 
implemented and on how it has affected decisions to be taken or criteria to be considered for the 
following ones, implementation and consolidation. Based on the information collected from 
interviews and official documents the phases can be described as follow: 
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Pre-investment: Association. It is also called stage of commercial activation, because the 
main goals are to strengthen the existent social capital in the district and to advertise the FBC 
program. The final product after the six-twelve months estimated for this first part of the process 
is a commercial and urban development plan to be implemented in the following stage. With a 
business approach in mind and the main goal being reaching joint collaboration between 
business owners, SERCOTEC selected the networks methodology created by the UNIDO BID-
Fomin (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). These guidelines were used to 
define the on-site work of district managers for the first phase of the program (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). 
In order to ensure that all stakeholders had a place in the process of participation, the 
program created a Local Associative Group (Grupo Asociativo Local, GAL) in each of the 
districts, that meets every week or every-other week for the Integrated Working Table (Mesa 
Integrada de Trabajo, MIT), even if the program is targeted to business owners; street vendors, 
residents, property owners among others, are also invited to participate in this meetings. Each 
district was assigned with one or two on-site-managers hired by SERCOTEC to lead the process 
of participation, reach out to business owners, and invite them to participate, and assist in the 
process of association, as well as with the district plan definition. In order to contact merchants 
and associations, managers used the business directory available at each Municipality and 
complemented the work with door-by-door reaching. Even more, on-site-managers are the 
communication channel between the district and SERCOTEC central office, from where their 
work is organized and supervised. 
Investment: Implementation of the Plan. In the two or three years determined for this 
stage, districts should implement the plan developed as a result of the pre-investment part. The 
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plan would have two main lines to be addressed: a commercial one that comes from the 
necessities identified in the diagnostic and the territorial work in each of the neighborhoods. A 
second aspect is the urban one, mainly related to public space improvement that would help to 
foster and strengthen the district commercial activity. 
Consolidation: Reaching Sustainability. This phase is defined as the moment when the 
associations formed during the first year of the program are able to financially sustain the BID. 
The association should manage quotas and find sources to pay for the two things SERCOTEC is 
financing now: on-site manager (BID Executive Director in the case of NYC) and promotional 
activities and events, or at least part of it (personal interview, January 18, 2016). There is no 
clarity yet on how revenues would be determined or collected, and it is not just about the legal 
and administrative tools to be used, but also if quotas for permanent resources would be 
mandatory, voluntary or a combination of both.  
One of the goals of the program is to create an association for project sustainability, but 
the consolidation phase, which is the one relevant when the districts reach sustainability, is not 
designed. Furthermore, interviews with business owners show that they are not aware that is the 
final goal of the project. In addition, authorities recognize they have not yet decided how the 
program will address the usual suspect issues that affect BIDs –free rider, representation and 
accountability. All this in a country whose laws would not allow the government to collect taxes 
for a particular purpose, where private-public associations are not a common thing to find and 
where resources to oversee and keep institutions accountable are always scarce. 
vi. Funding and Incentives 
The incomplete definition of the FBC program implies that funds and incentives are also 
not completely defined. The totality of funds assigned to the program is unclear and as part of the 
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current government agenda, and because it is a central government project of the FBC program, 
those already defined can only be secured until the year 2018. Future funding will depend on the 
investment priorities set by the following government. Just like the rest of the program, funding 
is specified only for the first stage, whose budget was determined based on other pilot projects 
previously implemented by SERCOTEC that resulted in the identification of initiatives of 
territorial development as a virtuous niche with potential to be exploited (personal interview, 
January 18, 2016). The agency proposed an average budget around USD 86,000 (CLP 60 
millions) for each district, which sums up to a total of USD 5,160,000 (CLP 3,600 millions), 
which is money enough to finance an on-site-manager and simple pilot projects, but not to keep 
the program running for more than a year.  
As established in the program regulation two thirds of the budget are equally distributed 
among districts to finance the implementation of trust projects during the pre-investment phase8; 
in the City of Iquique, for example, USD 14,300 (CLP10 millions) were destined to install 
surveillance cameras on the district streets. The rest is assigned to cover, among others, 
administrative costs like on-site-managers’ wages and costs related to running the program from 
the national office, as well as cost pertained to technical capacity building and experience and 
knowledge transfer, such as lectures and workshops with experts on Business Improvement 
Districts, collaborative sessions between on-site-managers and business owners participating. 
These resources were approved in the annual budget presented by the Ministry of Economics.  
The first issue resulting from the lack of definition in the FBC program regarding funding 
is related to the second stage, investment, which is expected to have a high participation of 
public space improvement projects. Funds are planned, according to a public official 
                                                
8 Resolution #9164:  Commercial Districts Regulation of April 1st 2015. 
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interviewed, to come from both SERCOTEC, for business support, marketing and promotional 
activities. and from the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 
MINVU) to finance the construction of projects related to the improvement or provision of 
sidewalk lightening, urban furniture, minor facilities (as public bathrooms), pavement, signage 
and public space ancillary works (as facades recovery or sanitation infrastructure) (SERCOTEC, 
2014c). Resources for services like security, sanitation or waste management, or for maintenance 
are not defined. Even if official communication at SERCOTEC website informs that each 
neighborhood would have access to up to USD 1,100,000 (CLP750 millions) to implement urban 
improvements in the second stage9, MINVU public statements from 2014 and 2015 inform that 
only 30 districts would receive funding (MINVU, 2016), and at the moment of data collection 
public officials did not have clarity on the availability of MINVU funds and/or if they would be 
exclusively appointed to the FBC program. Furthermore, resources from SERCOTEC itself are 
not defined for the second stage (personal interview, January 18, 2016). At the moment of the 
interviews, the agency was studying how long they should finance on-site-managers and if it 
should be the same type of professional. For the moment, they are thinking that decisions would 
be made case-by-case depending on the maturity of each district association and how much help 
they need to continue with the program. In respect to this topic, SERCOTEC is evaluating which 
districts should pass to the second phase and which ones should be dropped from the program 
(personal interview, January 18, 2016).  
While public officials at the different government agencies are working to define how to 
implement district development plans and reach the economic sustainability phase, the three 
business owners were participating in the program mainly because their district was chosen to 
                                                
9 http://www.sercotec.cl/Qui%C3%A9nesSomos/Noticias/Nuevoprogramadefortalecimientoparabarrioscom.aspx#/0 
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get extra public funding. The case of Patronato is particularly of interest, because they recognize 
the value of association pursuit the program has, but they are involved in it so they can have 
access to the promised MINVU funds to implement at least one of the projects defined by a plan 
the neighborhood already agreed on and in which the community worked for almost three years. 
One of the business owners recognized that even if there is a lack of cohesion among the 
different stakeholders, property owners, business owners, and street vendors already have a plan 
they would like to implement. As one of the business owners said: "everybody wants different 
things for the neighborhood, but we already have a plan where we reached consensus on what we 
want for the neighborhood, this is the based that is what we people involved in the participation 
process want to be implemented with the resources of this new program" (personal interview, 
January 11th, 2016). 
Finally, the only aspect specified for the last stage, consolidation, is that businesses 
should be able to financially sustain the district. According to a public official, after 3 to 4 years 
of associations and then implementation of the first projects for the districts, the associations 
should be able to collect the resources to keep the activities and projects going (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). However, business owners are not aware of how the third stage 
will work, so for now, as interview responses show, first their participation in the program has 
short-term expectations, and second, the program has no opposition. The latest can be explain 
because, even if public officials said that the program asks for co-financing from the beginning, 
business owners feel their only commitment is for them to participate. They have made 
contributions only related to discounts, keeping the store open, and having convenient prizes 
when a promotional event is organized. 
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The incentives used in this first year have had good results in fostering associations; 
business owners are forming or reviving associations to participate in the program. The case of 
Barrio Victoria is an example of this, the FBC program has been able to strengthen networks and 
motivate people to participate. One of the main topics discussed in the MIT at Barrio Victoria 
was when the associations should be legalized. They have already decided to form two 
associations. First the GAL was working to form a new chamber of commerce open to all 
business owners willing to participate (the previous one was not legalized, it was all based on 
people’s words, in trust) (personal interview 2, January 13, 2016). With a legal and 
representative institution like this, merchants can work in name of the district, which is 
particularly important when dealing with other neighborhoods and central organizations as the 
Chamber of Commerce of Santiago. Second, some of the business owners, actively participating 
at the MIT, understood the importance of having a legal name as a group and have worked to 
form a cooperative. As one of the business owner states: "we form the association (cooperative) 
to be able to help each other. Is a help, we want to help each other to move forward, for example, 
what I'm doing, I'm in this to be able to fix this premise, it is very large, it needs an investment. 
(...) With the cooperative I think I can make it, to be able to fix, the program also includes facade 
repairs." (personal interview 2, January 13, 2016). 
This type of association that is independent from the other one, would give them a legal 
name to apply as a group for credits and other commercial assistance at the Municipality. This 
way, even if the FBC program fails they can still work together to get resources to improve their 
businesses. Unlike the Chamber of Commerce, cooperatives are not only representative, but they 
also allow commercial goals. It is important to mention that, at least in the case of Barrio 
Victoria, even if the reason to form associations is that both the Municipality and SERCOTEC 
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need to deal with legal representatives of the neighborhood, particularly when transferring 
resources to finance trust projects in the first stage, the definition and formation of these entities 
was made by the business owners, without particular support from the on-site-manager (Meeting 
observation, January 13, 2016). 
Incentives, if analyzed from a short-term perspective, have had good impacts, but from a 
long-term point of view, they seem in some cases to be playing against the success of the 
program. All interviewees, public officials, on-site-managers and business owners agreed that the 
most difficult obstacle to overcome is the lack of trust, both among merchants and in the 
government. However, as an example, the intensity of the weekly meetings is playing against the 
credibility of the program. When business owners were asked what they did not like about the 
program, they all responded without doubting that it is taking too long to see things done. As 
already mentioned most business owners are involved in this process to take advantage of the 
resources they were promised and after more than 6 months actively participating, they do not 
see any results. If we add this to the case of Patronato where the community already spent three 
years in developing a plan for the neighborhood and have not seen any changes, the trust in the 
program is not much. One of the business owners said that he was willing to keep participating 
until he gets tired of seeing that nothing is happening: "I don't know if I'm naive, but I will err in 
the side of naivety and keep going as far as possible. I don't want to miss the opportunity to have 
something concrete being done in the neighborhood" (personal interview, January 11, 2016). 
vii. Lack of Information and Need for Transparency 
When asking BIDs representatives in NYC, they all agreed trust and revenues are key to 
form a BID. In the case of Chile, on-site-managers unanimously said the major obstacle was 
mistrust among merchants and between them and the government. Comments like the following 
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ones describe the relation between mistrust among merchants and the importance of having 
access to the funds promised for the districts in the FBC pilot program: "nobody wants to 
commit to nobody unless you have something to win. Nobody wants to do anything for others" 
(personal interview 1, January 13, 2016), "if we don't do something tangible nobody believes 
things are being made, and in general here everybody mistrust on everybody, so when you try to 
do something or you go out to ask for resources they think is for your own pocket" (personal 
interview, January 11, 2016). 
In addition to the lack of communication from SERCOTEC to business owners, on-site-
managers think that for the definitive program more effort should be put into informing the 
community on how the process is going, what decisions had the GAL been made at MIT weekly 
meetings. They agreed everybody should be informed about the program progress in the district, 
even those not attending the meetings, because they will be affected by the decisions taken here. 
They recognized that the lack of information can harm the work done so far in reviving and 
forming associations, but most of all, the trust from and among the people that has been reached 
during these first months of working with the community (personal interview, January 5, 2016). 
From interviews with all three different stakeholders involved in the FBC, it is clear that 
business owners do not have all the information needed to have an opinion on the long-term of 
the program. In part, it is because the program was not thoroughly designed from the beginning, 
but also because business owners do not know how the program is being conceived, which 
prevents them to have a long-term commitment. It is difficult for people to understand how does 
the whole picture look like if they do not have all the information. 
According to the description of the third phase by official documents and by public 
officials interviewed, even if the process of how the third phase is going to work is not specified, 
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it is clear that it should be financed with contributions from the private sector. But at the moment 
of interviews, business owners did not know they would have to co-finance the program at that 
stage. From interviews with public officials, it is clear that they have not been informed that the 
third phase should be paid by them, when is going to change to that system, how much they 
would have to pay/contribute, and how their money is going to be administered (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). 
Furthermore, for the second stage at the central offices, officials are already considering 
to drop some of the districts from the program. This is due to the lack of funding from MINVU, 
and regardless of the maturity of districts’ associations. Nowadays, business owners participating 
in the pilot project are not aware that they can be "kicked out" of the program or that they would 
have to finance an important part of their plan implementation. None of this information has 
been provided to the business owners, even if this means a change of plans in what was promise 
to them at the beginning.  
In addition, it is important to mention that only after interviews with the public officials, 
and discussions about this situation did they realize that business owners are not clear about the 
co-financing part of the program, that resources may not arrive, or even that some neighborhoods 
can be pulled out of the program. The moment that Business owners learn about this is going to 
be key in terms of preserving the trust achieved in this past year and keep the program going, or 
even more, keep business owners interested in working to improve their business conditions and 
opportunities. A business owner involved in the program said in November 2015 to SERCOTEC 
consultant: "you (SERCOTEC) cannot abandon us because I'm betting my credibility in my 
neighborhood" (Skype interview, February 24, 2016). 
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Finally there is a need for more clarity among the people working from the government. 
The fact that there is confusion when on-site-managers describe the program, particularly when 
related to the third stage, means that even if business owners ask about the future of the program 
they do not have answers. This is something to be expected because they were hired to make the 
first phase of the program happen. 
viii. Creating Unrealistic Expectations 
The lack of both, a definition of the whole program and transparency in its process, added 
to the fact that the program depends on two different government institutions (MINVU and 
SERCOTEC) with different approaches, timing and financing tools working together, is creating 
not only the wrong incentives, but also unrealistic expectations and promises the government 
would not be able to fulfill. From the information collected in the interviews and official 
documents it is possible to identify at least three categories of expectations: timing, public 
resources availability, and where this resources can be utilized.  
Timing expectations. FBC program specifies that the second phase, implementation, 
should happen from six to twelve months after on-site-managers started working with business 
owners. For instance, Patronato hopes to have something implemented in March 2016, less than 
a year after the starting of the program. They were told the district had resources assigned and 
they would like to use them to implement improvements to the public space that was previously 
defined in a plan for the area (personal interview, January 11, 2016). However, funds that come 
from the government are slow, particularly if they are related to public space construction 
because they respond to different protocols and processes that need to be fulfilled before this 
phase, in contrast to those resources destined to support merchants directly. Then, construction 
times do not respond to business rhythm or timing. It is a shared feeling among business owners 
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that the program is taking too long to come with tangible results. They think that the progress of 
the program does not resemble what was presented to them. In addition, they do not know when 
projects are going to be implemented; no due date has been given to them.  
When money comes from the government the processes are slow, then we are tied 
to this tedious... but we want something concrete, don't go through all the steps. If 
you speak with street cart people, the say: we need this for today; we need 
everything for the day before yesterday. There are good and bad things. The good 
part is that we have all this money, but sometimes also I get lost a little, because 
there are this participatory meetings, but the people didn't attend, ... if we saw that 
things are happening faster or with less processes I think all the people will attend. 
We don't want to take two years in building public restrooms. 
– Personal interview, January 11, 2016 
The program proposed by on-site-managers considers meetings every week that business 
owners are asked to attend. Some of them have decided to collaborate on a day-to-day basis and 
while they still have faith in the program there is an enormous risk of people getting bored and 
losing faith not only in this program, but also in any other that can come in the future. According 
to one of the business owner, "well, the timing that we have to go through phases, and the times 
are long. We have meetings every week, but the program of the project that was presented to us 
has been slow. We are just working on that, after almost a year. In what is the program itself" 
(personal interview 1, January 13, 2016). 
Expectations on available resources. This situation responds mainly to poor information 
managing, which means information that has not been provided on time, as well as of an 
information leakage about public resources available. The first misunderstanding is that the 
assignment of resources is not exactly as it was publicized. The FBC program has an average 
budget of USD 86,000 (CLP60 millions) per district, but this does not mean each of them would 
get that amount of funds. As explained by a public official, only USD 57,000 (CLP40 millions) 
are assigned to each district to implement programs and projects during the first six to twelve 
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months of the program, the rest of it goes to finance the implementation of this first stage 
managed from SERCOTEC national office.  
A second point of confusion is the resources promised by the program that should come 
from MINVU, which according to one of the public officials interviewed is the result of an 
information leakage. According to some newspapers, MINVU would provide USD 1,100,000 
(CLP750 millions) to each neighborhood for the construction of urban project improvements. As 
mentioned when describing funding, MINVU is planning to provide funds up to that amount and 
only for thirty of the sixty districts. Even more, the money is not currently available, because of 
two main reasons: first, it is not part of the annual budget and, second not all the projects could 
qualify based on their social impact. In order for districts to access these resources, MINVU 
would have to adapt one of their current neighborhood improvement programs or create a new 
one specific for commercial districts in the FBC program.  
Expectations on the use of resources. Interviews with business owners and observation 
during community meetings showed that both districts have different interests in what the 
resources should be used for. In Barrio Victoria, where public space is relatively in good shape, 
business owners are more worried about increasing sales, while in Patronato the main concern is 
to improve the physical environment. (Observations, January 7th and 13th, 2016) 
In this case the money invested in the first stage of the program on promotional events 
has been very important for them. As one of the business owners states, "in first place, I would 
say the project of emblematic neighborhoods has been a good project. I describe it as a project 
good to the merchant because it boosts the purchasing and sales of the products that one can 
made or buy for the public. Then through out all the marketing and communication events about 
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the neighborhood that have been organized, that helps to get people interest to come to a 
neighborhood to buy and not going to a retail" (personal interview 2, January 13, 2016). 
Sidewalks poor condition, lack of parking spaces and public bathrooms are the main 
concern in Patronato. In this district street vendors and business and property owners agree in 
one thing: Patronato needs to create a brand and show it through physical investments; in other 
words, it needs to have a visual impact. They believe the funds they would receive from the 
program should be invested in visible actions, not only in defining plans or strategies. They 
already have a plan, and they see in FBC program the opportunity to start making that plan come 
true. With this first batch of resources they could show people that things can be done to 
revitalized the neighborhood, and, with this, recover people's trust and faith in the programs. 
One of the street vendors that has actively participated in the publicity strategy thinks the 
program is mainly thought to improve public spaces, and even as she knows that this is going to 
benefit mostly the property owners, she still wants better and cleaner sidewalks so her clients are 
comfortable when buying. A business owner said about the program: "the benefits –in the future, 
because so far there hasn't been any particularly physical one– is to strengthen the neighborhood 
physically, visually, because there is a search for strategies in what to invest to improve the 
public space, because this does not favor the businesses from the door to the inside, it is for the 
public spaces", and "if the government is going to invest in something physical it should favor 
everybody, that does not have to disfavor the smallest to favor the big one" (personal interview 
1, January 13, 2016). 
From the perspective of association and building trust, the major risk is that funds 
assigned to each district end up in a "piece of paper", a report. This seems to be one of the 
outcomes that will damage people expectations and their willingness to participate in the creation 
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of a BID, particularly if it depends on the government. Business owners involved are those that 
at the same time are communicating the government’s promises to the people they represent. So 
far these promises have change in a significant way, so if the results are not as expected, they 
will also lose credibility and others merchant’s trust, which could eventually harm their business 
relations.  
Top down approach 
Having the NYC BID model in mind, where the process of BID formation is lead by a 
business owners’ initiative, it is important to understand how the Chilean government is 
implementing the BID model from a top-down approach since it is an initiative with a very local 
impact that is financed, promoted and implemented from the national level.  
From the interviews in Chile, NYC and informal conversations with experts in the topic, 
it is possible to identify pros and cons of having a top-down approach. Pros refer mainly to the 
government showing interest in the empowering of business owners, which according to Carmen 
Moreno (Skype interview, February 24, 2016) eases the road to create the legal framework and 
provide public resources needed for the model to be implemented in its totality. Cons are related 
to the incentives and long-term success of the program –mainly related to economic incentives 
and selection process–, strategies are not considering different contexts and district conditions, 
and to the risk of bureaucracy making the process too slow. In addition to these pros and cons, 
the program also represents the first of its type in Chile, where the lack of experience and more 
than one governmental institution involved in direct funding, and thus, defining the program can 
translate into another con, but not necessarily related to the top-down planning approach.  
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i. Institutional Structure 
In order to fully comprehend how the program is being implemented, it is important to 
first understand how it is organized in terms of governmental organizations, authorities and 
responsibilities. Although the leading government institution for the FBC program is 
SERCOTEC, during the definition of the program it was specified that the target would be 
groups of business owners located in the same district, with this location condition the scope of 
program change to a territorial one, whose area of work and expertise surpasses the ones of 
SERCOTEC. The biggest difference between economic and territorial development is the 
participatory process.  SERCOTEC is used to work with economic development policies that 
target individuals. When involving public space or any instance or context outside the private 
property of the individual getting support, the process steps into another ministerial jurisdiction, 
the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU). Any project under MINVU's jurisdiction 
(territorial or legal), which expects to get funding through it, requires a participatory process with 
a broader spectrum of stakeholders. In response to this, MINVU was incorporated as a partner 
resulting in an inter-agency collaborative working process. This also meant that other national 
government department under both ministries as the Housing and Urbanization Service (Servicio 
de Vivienda y Urbanización, SERVIU) in charge of urban projects, and the National Tourism 
Service (Servicio Nacional de Turismo, SERNATUR), also support and have a say in how the 
program is designed and implemented. These agencies are particularly important when acting at 
a regional level.(SERCOTEC, 2014a) 
In line with the requirements on private-public collaboration defined by the National 
Urban Planning Policy (Política Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, PNUD), two participatory 
advisory and supervising instances were created: one National Council for Commercial District 
Development (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo de Barrios Comerciales) and thirteen 
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Commercial District Committees (Comité de Barrios Comerciales) that were constituted for 
every region. 
Members of the National Council for Commercial District Development are the Minister 
of Economy, Development and Tourism (who presides over the council), the Minister of 
Housing and Urbanism, the Deputy Secretary of Regional Development, the Executive Vice-
President of the Corporation for Development (Coorporación de Fomento, CORFO), 
SERCOTEC CEO, and seven representatives of the civil society with proven expertise on the 
subject designated by the Council President in consultation with the Minister of Housing and 
Urbanism 10 (Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, 2014b). They are responsible for 
"supporting the formation of the regional Commercial District Committees, and the realization of 
a registry if districts are at regional level; participating, together with the Regional Commercial 
District Committees, in commercial districts definition and prioritization, and presenting the list 
of selected districts to the Ministry of Economy; and finally, promoting and informing about the 
progress of the FBC program, and determining financial resources to be assigned to the districts 
once they have presented their development plan." (SERCOTEC, 2014b) 
Regional Commercial District Committees members are government officials 
representing the regional secretaries of the Ministries of Housing and Urbanism and Economy, 
Development and Tourism (committee chair); regional directors of SERCOTEC and CORFO, 
representatives of business associations, chambers of commerce, and representatives for regional 
government secretaries MINVU and SERVIU (SERCOTEC, 2014b). The task of this committee 
                                                
10 At the moment of this thesis, the seven representatives were: Luis Eduardo Bresciani Lecannilier, President of the 
Council for Urban Development; María Elena Ducci Valenzuela, President of Ciudad Viva; Verónica González Gil, 
advisor of the Santiago Chamber of Commerce and Comunidad Mujer; Juan Antonio Señor Ledesma, President of 
the Bio-Bo Region Retail Trade and Tourism Federation; Roberto Moris Iturrieta, Professor at the School of 
Architecture, Design and Urbanism at Catholic University; Alejandro Aravena Mori, architect at Diseño/Elemental 
Chile and 2016 Pritzker Prize; and Patrico Jadue Lama, entrepreneur.  
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is to strengthen agreements and actions for the commercial districts, while it also has to facilitate 
and coordinate an efficient private-public management and maintain a balance between 
productive and commercial, urban and social issues (SERCOTEC, 2015). 
ii. District selection 
Districts were proposed by the Regional Committee and chosen by the National Council 
based on requirements defined by the SERCOTEC. The only exception is the case of the 
Metropolitan Region where each Municipality nominated districts. In this case, 11 from 37 
districts were selected to participate in the pilot program. Local governments and regional 
committees were given fifteen days to fill out applications, and 60 where selected. The 
identification of districts was made based on the following definition of commercial district: "A 
commercial district is a portion of city's urban fabric that contains several small enterprises 
pertaining to commercial activities and which joint functioning foster their commercial 
attributes; in addition, this enterprises share some specific and particular social, cultural, spatial 
and formal characteristics, which gives them a unique and recognizable identity within the city." 
(SERCOTEC, 2014b, p. 1), while the selection criteria were a minimum number of enterprises, 
number of existing association, and a recognizable district identity. 
In this process of selection, the short time available, the lack of information on the 
location, characteristics of commercial areas, and the loose requirements resulted in a selection 
of districts that did not fulfill the profile for what the program was designed. Then, for the 
program’s final version, public officials are considering changing both the institutional structure 
and the process of district selection. According to them, municipalities should be the ones 
proposing the districts, and with this their commitment, to collaborate with the program, while 
SERCOTEC should have a record of the existing commercial areas in order to limit the area of 
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investment. This solutions are still a top-down approach and require more investment to be 
implemented, even more they would be adding bureaucracy to a process that if it is going to 
mean a private monetary contribution, should be a bottom-up one. This is when incentives for 
merchants and other stakeholders involved need to be clear from the beginning.  
iii. Local government involvement 
Starting from the process of district selection and institutional structure defined for the 
pilot phase, there is an obvious question to make: what about municipalities? Municipalities in 
Chile are the most local level of government; they are the institutions that work directly with the 
neighborhoods, those that regulate zoning, give permits to business to operate, are in charge of 
services as street cleaning and waste management and pay for most of the public spaces’ 
maintenance. So why are they not part of the plan? Or going further, do Municipalities support 
the implementation of BIDs in their territory? Today, municipalities are involved in the process 
because they were invited and the resources coming to the district will also benefit the rest of 
their territories, but there is no contract or legal obligation.  
From interviews, observations, and informal discussion with experts, it appears that 
Municipalities, more precisely mayors, will not be willing to, first, share power with the private 
sector in managing the commune and, second, it would be unlikely that they would made a 
decision to increase taxes because they would be risking loosing votes for their re-election. 
Furthermore, it is possible that they do not want or are not prepared to deal with issues as illegal 
street vendors, like the case of the Municipality of Maipú that pulled its business district out of 
the program. Another possible reason is that funding from SERCOTEC can go directly to a 
group or throughout an operating agent to implement a project, but because it is an institution 
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that exists to give direct support to merchants, its funds cannot go to the Municipality (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). 
Finally, the top down approach, even if it shows that the central government is interested 
and there is political will to make changes, is leaving out key stakeholders like the Municipality 
and selecting districts that may not have the conditions or interest necessary to complete the 
program up to the final stage of consolidation. This last issue is key. On-site-managers agree on 
how difficult it has been to convince people to participate, even with the incentives as they were 
presented in the beginning –business owners with no defined commitments towards the program. 
As an example, in the case of the La Chimba, persuading representatives to participate was very 
hard, and it is not clear if the reason was lack of interest or trust. This shows that, at least the top-
down approach to district selection should be reconsidered once the incentives for the final stage 
are defined. As one of the on-site-managers states: "first, getting to enchant them (merchants in 
Patronato) was a challenge. Because with the private sector was not that easy. In fact with the 
Central Vega (one of the four associations in La Chimba) it was very difficult, because only 
them already have three presidencies inside, with a common administration, but three different 
chairs, and to enchant them to participate in a program that neither provides that much 
investment was not an easy work" (personal interview, January 5, 2016). 
Lack of legal framework for permanent revenues, association and accountability 
There are different reasons why the third and final phase of the program has not been 
defined. Among them is the fact that a Commercial District is not defined by law, not even basic 
zoning and construction regulation make reference to the term. However, the stumbling block is 
the collection of revenues, who would/should pay and how they would/should be collected. The 
practical obstacle resides, leaving aside theoretic ones, in the fact that Chilean regulations do not 
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allow collecting taxes previously assigned for a particular purpose. In addition, there is no legal 
framework that entitles a government institution to collect taxes to be transferred to a privately 
managed organization; not even if it is not-for profit one. According to a public official, the only 
possibility within the current regulations would be that municipalities use the cleaning and 
ornament fee they are allowed to charge to improve and maintain public spaces, but in this case 
this institution would have to administer the funds. This decision depends on each municipality 
and for political reasons (risk of loosing votes) it is not likely to be implemented (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). 
At the beginning of the FBC program creation, the BID model was seen by SERCOTEC 
officials as the long-term goal to reach economic sustainability, where the leading entity is not 
the government (SERCOTEC in this case), but a private legal association that leads the 
commercial dynamic of the district using mainly private resources. The role of the government 
then is limited to a strategic and collaborative stakeholder position, but, because of the absence 
of regulations to collect assessments from the private sector, the officials in charge of the 
program design have looked to other experiences. One of them is the Open Skies Shopping 
Centers ("Centros Comerciales a Cielo Abierto") in Argentina. A program encouraged and 
financed by merchants, which is based on fee payments to finance particular and punctual 
activities or promotions organized and administered by the local government. According to one 
of SERCOTEC officers, the goal is to develop the best platforms for business owners to sell their 
products, model that could be implemented in Chile, for example, by the Chamber of Tourism. 
The major problem faced by this model, because the source of revenues is voluntary, is the risk 
of free riders that can damage the trust needed for business districts to succeed (personal 
interview, January 18, 2016). 
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Associations and its legal form are key aspects in the implementation of the FBC 
program. Its role and attributions would be determined by how the program decides to address 
the revenues issues, in a voluntary or mandatory way. However, they should have common 
characteristics as being: legally approved, so to have access to public resources; representative of 
different stakeholders, so they can speak in name of the district; accountable to both contributors 
and local community, because even if they were to be financed by private resources, the nature 
of part of their services takes advantage of the public space and/or create externalities, with an 
impact on the whole community. In addition to this, in order to access to SERCOTEC funds in 
particular, they should be institutions enrolled/inscribed to pay taxes, even if they are not 
supposed to pay taxes, this could mean leaving some people outside or a burden for illegal street 
vendors or small business that today do not properly comply with tax rules. 
At the moment of the interviews, SERCOTEC was considering to use one of the different 
associations that are now created through municipalities, because they are more comprehensive 
and allow groups to access public funds, they could be either operational like committees or 
territorial like community boards. However, the type of association needed is a Corporation type. 
Patronato already tried to form a Corporation that was rejected because even if the statutes 
included property owners, residents, business owners and street vendors, they were abusive. 
While you have an anchor store this is always going to happen. 
Despite accountability being one of the main issues when analyzing BIDs, it is not 
something SERCOTEC is considering. One of the reasons is that the program is targeted to 
business owners and the way SERCOTEC works when providing public funds has a very clear 
oversight process. However, the fact that the program is collaborative with MINVU and that 
services to be provided by the BID are most likely to have an impact in the public space, the rest 
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of the community would also be affected. Therefore, the government should make the 
associations accountable to the whole community.   
NYC BIDs and Chile FBC 
When comparing the Chilean FBC program in to NYC BIDs model several differences 
can be identified (Table 3). From them, it is important to have in mind those that have an impact 
in the success of the initiative as an economically sustainable one. First, there is a big difference 
in the planning approach. While NYC model is based on a bottom-up effort with property 
owners leading and promoting the BID formation, in Chile that role is taken by the National 
Government; resulting in a top-down scheme. Second, unlike NYC, which has a defined strategy 
for accessing to diverse and permanent financial sources, the Chilean program does not have a 
clear proposal. It only identifies public sources, and does not define the protocol to access the 
funds. Finally, the managing institution in NYC has clear rules that determine who should be 
part of the BID board and who has the majority of representatives. On the other hand, the 
Chilean model is aiming to use existing forms of legal association that do not address issues of 
representativeness and accountability.  
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Table 3 - Comparison table between NYC BID model and Chilean pilot project FBC 
             NYC - BID 
 
            CHILE - FBC 
 
TIME IN OPERATION and INITIATIVE ORIGIN 
 
• Started in 1976 as Special Assessment 
District (SAD) 
• NYC approved BID legislation in 1981 
 
• Property owners driven 




• National Government driven 
 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR BID FORMATION 
 
• Private Funds 
• Grants (Public) 
• Public Funds (National Government) 
 
SOURCES OF REVENUES FOR BID IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION 
 
• Tax assessment  
• Fundraising  
• Grants (public and private) 
• MINVU (for public space improvement) 
• SERCOTEC (for technical support) 




• BID board 
Voting members: Property owners 
(majority), City elected officials (4), 
Resident (1), Business owners  
Non-voting members: Other elected officials 
• Business Owners Association 





• Public safety 
• Marketing 
• Capital improvements 
• Streetscape 





• Public space improvement 
Sidewalk lightning,  
Urban furniture 
Minor facilities (as public bathrooms) 
Pavement 
Signage 
• Public space ancillary works 
Facades recovery 
Sanitation infrastructure 
• Business support, marketing and 
promotional activities 
 
TBD = to be defined; MINVU = Ministry of Housing and Urbanism; SERCOTEC = Technical 
Cooperation Service   
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the context of New York City Business Improvement District model, the Chilean 
program is not going to work. Furthermore, when thinking in long-term goals, there is no 
program at all. The work SERCOTEC has done so far has meant great progress in creating and 
strengthening associations, but that is not enough. If the FBC program is aiming to work as a 
BID model, where business owners collectively finance and plan services and activities for the 
area, then it needs to be completely defined. Incentives, compromises, services to be provided, 
source of resources, accountability, supervision and government roles should all be clearly 
defined and communicated. 
Three main recommendations are proposed to SERCOTEC as the agency in charge of 
defining and implementing the FBC program: concentrating efforts in a small number of 
districts; writing the required legislation to have a local and not national program; and creating a 
parallel program to promote association.  
Concentrating efforts in a small number of districts. Knowing resources are scarce, 
SERCOTEC should use the information gathered during these first moths working with the sixty 
selected districts to chose a few among them, maybe six, to continue with the pilot program. 
Because the FBC program has been presented as such, a pilot program, effort and resources 
should be focused in defining the rules, legal framework, and finance model the final program 
would need to be implemented. Districts selected to continue in the program should be diverse in 
their location and socioeconomic characteristics, and they should all have a strong association 
and a local government willing and committed to actively participate in the process of definition 
and implementation. Needless to say, this change in direction should be as transparent as 
possible and properly communicated to all stakeholders involved. 
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Writing the required legislation to have a local and not national scope. Commercial 
districts have an impact at a local scale. Hence, decisions should be made at a local level. 
Nowadays, resources to finance the FBC program are coming from the National Government, 
but the aim is to strengthen commercial districts so they reach a point were local associations can 
permanently finance activities and services in order to sustain the economic benefits and social 
capital improvements obtained with public resources during the first and second phases of the 
program. Then, in the long-term, when SERCOTEC steps aside, the major stakeholders would be 
business owners and Municipalities; the first ones in charge of financing and planning, and the 
second ones overseeing and authorizing. By writing the enabling legislation and work with the 
local governments to help them implement the program, the National Government can focus on 
providing assistantship and additional support to those areas with fewer resources, and it can 
give continuity to the program that otherwise would depend on changing presidential agendas.  
Creating a parallel program to promote association. The diversity of contexts among the 
country’s commercial districts shows an important gap in terms of level of association, technical 
capabilities and access to resources. From the NYC experience, it is clear that a strong 
association is needed to form BIDs. Therefore, SERCOTEC should create a pre-FBC to help 
districts to reach a minimum level of association that would allow them to move to the FBC 
program and succeed as a BID. This previous step should aim to short-term goals since it should 
show business owners that "when enterprises that are part of a commercial neighborhood are 
able to coordinate they can solve common problems and finance good and services of common 
interest easily", just as it was defined in the Productivity and Innovation Agenda (Ministry of 
Economy, Development and Tourism, 2014a). 
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Business owners have invested their time by actively collaborating with SERCOTEC for 
almost a year, in this first effort to implement a BID model, and are most likely to be 
disappointed with the result promised. For them, for those leaders, the following 
recommendations have been written. 
Taking advantage of the collective as a power of negotiation. Even if districts do not get 
access to the promised public resources, they can still keep working together to improve their 
districts. Acting like a collective, business owners can have access to better prices in raw 
materials, supplies, services to promote their business and better financing conditions. As 
associations they can also have access to several public funding from SERCOTEC and other 
government agencies to get technical training or access to funds for business improvement. 
Finally, as a group they have more power to push local government authorities to help them. 
Working with and for the community in the neighborhood. Associations should work, in 
the extent of their capacity, to provide services that serve both business owners and residents. 
The SERCOTEC consultant interviewed identifies two examples: implementing a child daycare 
center to facilitate parents shopping, or providing delivery services for the elderly.  
Fostering trust. The key for an association to succeed as a BID is to have the support of 
the business and property owners, as well as the one from the residents. Organizations should 
always act in a transparent way to create trust among the different stakeholders, and they should 
also aim to realistic projects to earn credibility. In this way they would have the support needed 
to form a BID when the legislation allows for that. 
When adapting the Business Improvement District model to Chile, government 
authorities should consider that it is not enough to believe in the communities and in their 
knowledge about what is best for them. The definition of the process of participation and the 
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institutions behind it is crucial. The decision-making and planning process of these organizations 
–that will represent the community and lead their projects– must be defined, regulated, and 
closely overseen by the government and by the same citizens that are being represented. The 
government has to facilitate the availability of public and accessible information, and make sure 
citizens are aware of their rights and obligations in order to demand accountability to the 
institutions acting for them. 
Finally, in order to have a better understanding of the impact of the program in Chile 
there is a need for more research to define the right indicators to evaluate its success. Literature 
on BIDs in NYC explores their impact on property values, crime rates, and increases in sales. 
Are these the right ones to consider for the Chilean case? What indicators are the most 
appropriate based on the nature and goals of the FBC program? The impact of private 
organizations managing public spaces is also a topic that needs further exploration, particularly 
in the case of Chile where private-public partnerships are mostly used in large urban 
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NYC Business Improvement Districts (December 2015)
  
NYC Business Improvement District (December 2015)
Name
1 Fulton Mall Improvement Association
2 165th Street Mall
3 Jamaica Center








12 Columbus - Amsterdam
13 Graham Avenue
14 Flatbush Avenue
15 Grand Central Partnership
16 HUB/3rd Avenue
17 Myrtle Avenue (Queens)
18 82nd Street Partnership
19 Kings Highway
20 Steinway Street
21 34th Street Partnership
22 MetroTech
23 Times Square Alliance
24 Lower East Side
25 Fifth Avenue
26 Woodhaven




31 White Plains Road










42 86th Street Bay Ridge
43 Kingsbridge
44 East Midtown Partnership
45 Downtown Flushing Transit Hub
46 Sutphin Boulevard
47 Myrtle Avenue Brooklyn Partnership
48 Forest Avenue
49 Fordham Road
50 Long Island City Partnership
51 161st Street
52 DUMBO Improvement District
53 Flatiron/23rd Street Partnership
54 Flatbush-Nostrand Junction





60 Park Slope 5th Avenue
61 Belmont
62 Fulton Area Business (FAB) Alliance






69 Hudson Yards/Hell's Kitchen Alliance
70 West Shore
71 South Shore BID
72 Meatpacking District










































































Neighborhood Year of creation
Downtown Brooklyn June 1976
Downtown Jamaica July 1978
Downtown Jamaica July 1979
Union Square July 1984
East New York July 1985
East Williamsburg July 1985
Prospect Heights/Park Slope January 1986
Midtown July 1986
Washington Heights July 1986
Brighton Beach January 1987
Flatbush January 1987




South Bronx July 1988
Ridgewood July  1988




Downtown Brooklyn January 1992
Midtown January 1992







Pelham Parkway October 1994
Downtown Manhattan January 1995
Sunset Park July 1995
Upper East Side April 1996
Jamaica July 1996
Northwest section of the Bronx January 1997
East Village January 1997
Lincoln Center April 1997
Midtown July 1997
Brooklyn Heights January 1998
Upper West Side January 2000
Bay Ridge October 2001
Kingsbridge October 2001
East Midtown January 2002
Downtown Flushing September  2003
Downtown Jamaica July 2004
Fort Greene / Clinton Hill April 2005
West Brighton June 2005
Fordham December 2004
Long Island City July 2005
Concourse Village April 2005
DUMBO December 2005
Flatiron District January 2006
Flatbush May 2006
Bay Ridge June 2006
Downtown Brooklyn June 2007
Sunnyside September 2007
Bayside October 2007
Hunts Point December 2007
Park Slope June 2008
Belmont December 2008
Fort Greene/Clinton Hill December 2008
Hudson Square February 2009
Bedford Stuyvesant March 2009





Bloomfield and Chelsea 2014





















































































BID staff:  
1. Who were the "stakeholders" involved? In favor / against. 
2. Who lead the process of formation? 
3. Where you involve in the BID formation? 
4. Did you participate in the definition of it conditions? (Boundaries, board members, 
extra-tax payment definition, board composition, board members, project 
definition) 
5. Did you vote? 
6. What was your status when voting? (Property owner, business owner, tenant, 
resident) (CHECK NYC BID REGULATIONS) 
7. What made you support/oppose to BID formation? 
8. Were there any proposals when the BID was forming you consider may have been 
good to implement or study? 
9. Did you belong to an association when the process started? Which? Was this group 
in favor, against or was indifferent? Why? 
10. If not, did you and other people form an association to support or fight the BID?  
11. How was the participatory process of BID formation? How did citizens learn about 
the BID? 
12. Where the information, community sessions and ballot places accessible to 
everybody? 
13. What material/info was presented to voters to inform them about the BID formation?  
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14. How is the process to get approval for a change in the BID budget or to approve new 
projects? How is the community involved in this process? 
15. How often board members change? How is the election process? Who has a vote? 
 
 
Santiago, Chile BIDs : 
1. SERCOTEC General Office (in charge of defining the program):  
Program general description 
1. As SERCOTEC what services are you providing now and would provide in the 
future to the FBC? 
2. How was the participatory process of FBC defined for the pilot program?  
3. What is the state of art of this process? 
4. What are the rules the program defined for the processes of association? 
FBC implementation  
1. How is the implementation of FBC defined in terms of institutionality? Is each FBC 
going to have an institution that represents its members? If yes, is it going to be a 
private, public or nonprofit organization?  
2. How is the economic sustainability planned? What are the tools, financial and legal, 
associations have to keep the program going after the five years proposed by the 
program? 
3. How are you planning for the accountability of these institutions? 
4. How is a person that is not in the board being represented in the decision-making? 
Takeaways from the first months 
 70 
1. How has been community reaction to the program?  
2. What is the level of involvement? Is it more or less than what you were expect? 
3. What key issues are you planning to change for the official program? 
 
2. SERCOTEC neighborhood agent (gestor del barrio):  
Role 
1. What is your role in the implementation of the FBC pilot program? 
2. What districts are you in charge of? 
Participatory process 
1. Who leads the process of participation? 
2. How is the outreach and promotion of the community meetings? What resources you 
use to inform about the FBC and to invite citizens to be involved? 
Takeaways from the first months 
1. How has been the community reactions to the program? 
2. Why people support the program? What do they like about it? 
3. What are the main concerns people have? What do they not like or are uncertain 
about supporting the program? 
4. Have you encounter pushback reactions or strongly disagreeing opinions? 
5. What is the level of involvement? Is it more or less than what you were expecting? 
6. How many people actively participate or attend to meetings? 
7. Are they residents, business owners, and property owners? 
8. What other stakeholders are involved? (Street vendors) 
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9. What key issues are you considering important for the official program to change? 
(Regarding participatory process, information availability, implementation strategy) 
 
3. Citizens affected (business owners, property owners, residents, others):  
FBC knowledge 
1. Can you describe what is the FBC program? 
2. How did you learn about it? 
3. Do you know what are the benefits and commitments if you form part of it?  
Program opinion 
1. What do you like about the program? 
2. What you do not like about it? 
3. What do you not understand or you think you need more information about? 
Participation 
1. How many meetings have you attended? 
2. How did you learn about those meetings? What resources you use to inform about 
the FBC and to invite citizens to be involved? 
3. Who do you ask for more information or ask to clarify doubts? 
 
 
 
